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Abstract. Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data
set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as con-
straints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications
such as combinatorial auctions. In the auction setting, we present an efficient
combinatorial algorithm to find a virtual valuation function with the opti-
mal (additive) rationality guarantee. Moreover, we show that there exists
such a valuation function that both is individually rational and is minimum
(that is, it is component-wise dominated by any other individually ratio-
nal, virtual valuation function that approximately fits the data). Similarly,
given upper bound constraints on the valuation function, we show how to
fit the maximum virtual valuation function with the optimal additive ra-
tionality guarantee. In practice, revealed preference bidding constraints are
very demanding. We explain how approximate rationality can be used to
create relaxed revealed preference constraints in an auction. We then show
how combinatorial methods can be used to implement these relaxed con-
straints. Worst/best-case welfare guarantees that result from the use of such
mechanisms can be quantified via the minimum/maximum virtual valuation
function.
1 Introduction
Underlying the theory of consumer demand is a standard rationality as-
sumption: given a set of items with price vector p, a consumer will demand
the bundle x of maximum utility whose cost is at most her budget B. Of
fundamental import, therefore, is whether or not the decision making be-
haviour of a real consumer is consistent with the maximization of a utility
function. Samuelson [18,19] introduced revealed preference to provide a the-
oretical framework within which to analyse this question. Furthermore, this
concept now lies at the heart of current empirical work in the field; see, for
example, Gross [11] and Varian [23]. Specifically, Samuelson [18] conjectured
that the weak axiom of revealed preference (warp) was a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for integrability – the ability to construct a utility function
which fits observed behaviour.
However, Houtthakker [14] proved that the weak axiom was insufficient.
Instead, he presented a strong axiom of revealed preference (sarp) and
showed non-constructively that it was necessary and sufficient in the case
where behaviour is determined via a single-valued demand function. Afriat [1]
provided an extension to multi-valued demand functions – where ties are al-
lowed – by showing that the generalized axiom of revealed preference (garp)
is necessary and sufficient for integrability.1 Furthermore, Afriat’s approach
was constructive (producing monotonic, concave, piecewise-linear utility func-
tions) and applied to the setting of a finite collection of observational data.
This rendered his method more suitable for practical use.
In addition to its prominence in testing for rational behaviour, revealed
preference has become an important tool in mechanism design. A notable
area of application is auction design. For combinatorial auctions, Ausubel,
Cramton and Milgrom [4] proposed bidding activity rules based upon warp.
These rules are now standard in the combinatorial clock auction, one of
the two prominent auction mechanisms used to sell bandwidth. In part,
the warp bidding rules have proved successful because they are extremely
difficult to game [6]. Harsha et al. [13] examine garp-based bidding rules,
and Ausubel and Baranov [3] advocate incorporating such constraints into
bandwidth auctions. Based upon Afriat’s theorem, these garp-based rules
imply that there always exists a utility function that is compatible with
the bidding history. This gives the desirable property that a bidder in an
auction will always have at least one feasible bid – a property that cannot
be guaranteed under warp.
Revealed preference also plays a key role in motivating the generalised
second price mechanism used in adword auctions. Indeed, these position auc-
tions have welfare maximizing solutions with respect to a revealed preference
equilibrium concept; see [23] and [8].
1.1 Our Results
Multiple methods have been proposed to approximately measure how con-
sistent a data set is with rational behaviour; see Gross [11] for a comparison
of a sample of these approaches. In this paper, we show how a graphical
viewpoint of revealed preference can be used to obtain a virtual valuation
function that best fits the data set. Specifically, we show in Section 3 that
an individually rational virtual valuation function can be obtained such that
its additive deviation from rationality is exactly the minimum mean length
1 Afriat [1] gave several equivalent necessary and sufficient conditions for integrability.
One of these, cyclical consistency, is equivalent to garp as shown by Varian [21].
2
of a cycle in a bidding graph. This additive guarantee cannot be improved
upon. Furthermore, we show there exists a unique minimum valuation func-
tion from amongst all individually rational virtual valuation functions that
optimally fit the data. Similarly, given a set of upper bound constraints, we
show how to find the unique maximum virtual valuation that optimally fits
the data, if it exists.
Imposing revealed preference bidding rules can be harsh. Indeed, Cram-
ton [6] states that “there are good reasons to simplify and somewhat weaken
the revealed preference rule”. These reasons include complexity issues, com-
mon value uncertainty, the complication of budget constraints, and the fact
that a bidder’s assessment of her valuation function often changes as the
auction progresses! The concept of approximate rationality, however, natu-
rally induces a relaxed form of revealed preference rules. We examine such
relaxed bidding rules in Section 4, show how they can be implemented com-
binatorially, and show how to construct the minimal and maximal valuation
functions which fit the data, which may be useful for quantifying worst/best-
case welfare guarantees.
2 Revealed Preference
In this section, we first review revealed preference. We then examine its use
in auction design and describe how to formulate it in terms of a bidding
graph.
2.1 Revealed Preference with Budgets
The standard revealed preference model instigated by Samuelson [18] is as
follows. We are given a set of observations
{(B1,p1,x1), (B2,p2,x2), . . . , (BT ,pT ,xT )} .
At time t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the set of items has a price vector pt and the consumer
chooses to spend her budget Bt on the bundle xt.
2 We say that bundle
xt is (directly) revealed preferred to bundle y, denoted xt  y, if y was
affordable when xt was purchased. We say that bundle xt is strictly revealed
preferred to bundle y, denoted xt ≻ y, if y was (strictly) cheaper than xt
when xt was purchased. This gives revealed preference (1) and strict revealed
2 It is not necessary to present the model in terms of “time”. We do so because this best
accords with the combinatorial auction application.
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preference (2):
pt · y ≤ pt · xt ⇒ xt  y (1)
pt · y < pt · xt ⇒ xt ≻ y (2)
Furthermore, a basic assumption is that the consumer optimises a locally
non-satiated utility function.3 Consequently, at time t she will spend her en-
tire budget, i.e., pt ·xt = Bt. In the absence of ties, preference orderings give
relations that are anti-symmetric and transitive. This leads to an axiomatic
approach to revealed preference formulated in terms of warp and sarp by
Houthakker [14]. The weak axiom of revealed preference (warp) states that
the relation should be asymmetric, i.e. x  y ⇒ y 6 x. Its transitive clo-
sure, the strong axiom of revealed preference (sarp) states that the relation
should be acyclic. Our interest lies in the general case where ties are allowed.
This produces what we dub the k-th Axiom of Revealed Preference (karp):
Given a fixed integer k and any κ ≤ k
xt = xt0  xt1  · · ·  xtκ−1  xtκ = y ⇒ y ⊁ xt . (3)
There are two very important special cases of karp. For k = 1, this is
simply warp, i.e. xt  y ⇒ y 6≻ xt. This is just the basic property that
for a preference ordering, we cannot have that y is strictly preferred to xt if
xt is preferred to y. On the other hand, suppose we take k to be arbitrarily
large (or simply larger than the total number of observed bundles). Then we
have the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp), the simultaneous
application of karp for each value of k. In particular, garp encodes the
property of transitivity of preference relations. Specifically, for any k, if
xt = xt0  xt1  · · ·  xtk−1  xtk = y ,
then, by transitivity, xt  y. The first axiom of revealed preference then
implies that y ⊁ xt.
The underlying importance of garp follows from a classical result of
Afriat [1]: there exists a nonsatiated, monotone, concave utility function
that rationalizes the data if and only if the data satisfy garp. Brown and
Echenique [5] examine the setting of indivisible goods and Echenique et al.
[7] consider the consequent computational implications.
3 Local non-satiation states that for any bundle x there is a more preferred bundle
arbitrarily close to x. A monotonic utility function is locally non-satiated, but the
converse need not hold.
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2.2 Revealed Preference in Combinatorial Auctions
As discussed, a major application of revealed preference in mechanism design
concerns combinatorial auctions. Here, there are some important distinctions
from the standard revealed preference model presented in Section 2.1. First,
consumers are assumed to have quasilinear utility functions that are linear in
money. Thus, they seek to maximise profit. Second, the standard assumption
is that bidders have no budgetary constraints. For example, if profitable
opportunities arise that require large investments then these can be obtained
from perfect capital markets. (This assumption is slightly unrealistic; Harsha
et al. [13] show how to implement a budgeted revealed preference model for
combinatorial auctions; see also Section 4.4).
Third, the observations (pt,xt), for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , are typically not pur-
chases but are bids made over a collection of auction rounds. When offered
a set of prices at time t the consumer bids for bundle xt.
So what would a model of revealed preference be in this combinatorial
auction setting? Suppose that at time t we select bundle xt and that at an
earlier time s we selected bundle xs. Assuming a quasi-linear utility function
and no budget constraint, we have revealed:
v(xt)− pt · xt ≥ v(xs)− pt · xs (4)
v(xs)− ps · xs ≥ v(xt)− ps · xt (5)
Summing Inequalities (4) and (5) and rearranging gives
(pt − ps) · xs ≥ (pt − ps) · xt (6)
This is the revealed preference condition for combinatorial auctions proposed
as a bidding activity rule by Ausubel, Crampton and Milgrom [4]. The ac-
tivity rule simply states that, between time s and time t, the price of bundle
xs must have risen by at least as much as the price of xs. If condition (6) is
not satisfied then the auction mechanism will not allow the later bid to be
made.
Observe that the bidding rule (6) was derived directly from the assump-
tion of utility maximisation. This unbudgeted revealed preference auction
model can, though, also be viewed within the framework of the standard
budgeted model of revealed preference. To do this, we assume the bidder
has an arbitrarily large budget B. In particular, prices will never be so
high that she cannot afford to buy every item. Second, to model quasi-
linear utility functions, we treat money as a good. Specifically, given a bun-
dle of items x = (x1, . . . , xn) and an amount x0 of money we denote by
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xˆ = (x0, x1, . . . , xn) the concatenation of x0 and x. If p = (p1, . . . , pn) is
the price vector for the the non-monetary items, then pˆ = (1, p1, . . . , pn)
gives the prices of all items including money.
In this n+1 dimensional setting, let us select bundle xˆt at time t. As the
budget B is arbitrarily large, we can certainly afford the bundle xs at this
time. But we may not be able to afford bundle xˆs, as then we must also pay
for the monetary component at a cost of B−ps ·xs. However, we can afford
the bundle xs plus an amount B−pt ·xs of money. Applying revealed prefer-
ence to {xˆ, pˆ}, we have revealed that xˆt = (B − pt · xt,xt)  (B − pt · xs,xs).
Hence, by quasilinearity, subtracting the monetary component from both
sides, we have,
(0,xt)  ((B − pt · xs)− (B − pt · xt),xs) = (pt · xt − pt · xs,xs) .
Equivalently,
v(xt) ≥ v(xs) + pt · xt − pt · xs . (7)
But Inequality (7) is equivalent to Inequality (4). Inequality (5) follows sym-
metrically, and together these give the revealed preference bidding rule (6).
Note that this bidding rule is derived via the direct comparison of two bun-
dles.
We can now extend this bidding rule to incorporate indirect comparisons
in a similar fashion to the extension from warp to sarp via transitivity.
This produces a garp-based bidding rule. Namely, suppose we bid for the
money-less bundle xi at time ti, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, where 1 ≤ ti ≤ T . Thus
we have revealed that
(0,xi)  ((B − pi · xi+1)− (B − pi · xi),xi+1)
= (pi · xi − pi · xi+1,xi+1)
This induces the inequality
v(xi)− pi · xi ≥ v(xi+1)− pi · xi+1 . (8)
Summing (8) over all i, we obtain
k∑
i=0
(v(xi)− pi · xi) ≥
k∑
i=0
(v(xi+1)− pi · xi+1) ,
where the sum in the subscripts are taken modulo k. Rearranging now gives
the combinatorial auction karp-based bidding activity rule:
(pk − p0) · x0 ≥
k∑
i=1
(pi − pi−1) · xi . (9)
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For k arbitrarily large, this gives the garp-based bidding rule. In order
to qualitatively analyze the consequences of imposing karp-based activity
rules, it is informative to now provide a graphical interpretation of the these
rules.
2.3 A Graphical View of Revealed Preference
Given the set of price-bid pairings {(pt,xt) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T}, we create a
directed graph G = (V,A), called the bidding graph, to which we will assign
arc lengths ℓ. There is a vertex in V for each possible bundle – that is, there
are 2n bundles in an n-item auction. For each observed bid xt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
there is an arc (xt,y) for each bundle y ∈ V . In order to define the length
ℓxt,y of an arc (xt,y), note that Inequality (4) applied to xs = y gives
v(y) ≤ v(xt) + pt · (y − xt) ,
otherwise we would prefer bundle y at time t. For the arc length, we would
like to simply set ℓxt,y = pt · (y − xt). Observe, however, that the bundle
xt may be chosen in more than one time period. That is, possibly xt = xt′
for some t 6= t′. Therefore the bidding graph is, in fact, a multigraph. It
suffices, though, to represent only the most stringent constraints imposed by
the bidding behaviour. Thus, we obtain a simple graph by setting
ℓxt,y = min
t′
{pt′ · (y − xt) : xt′ = xt} .
Now the warp-based bidding rule (6) of Ausubel et al. [4] is equivalent to
(pt − ps) · xs − (pt − ps) · xt ≥ 0 .
However,
ℓxs,xt + ℓxt,xs
= min
s′
{ps′ · (xt − xs) : xs′ = xs}+min
t′
{pt′ · (xs − xt) : xt′ = xt}
≤ ps · (xt − xs) + pt · (xs − xt)
= (pt − ps) · xs − (pt − ps) · xt .
It is then easy to see that the bidding constraint (6) is violated if and only
if the bidding graph contains no negative digons (cycles of length two). Fur-
thermore, we can interpret karp and garp is a similar fashion. Hence, the
k-th axiom of revealed preference is equivalent to requiring that the bidding
graph not contain any negative cycles of cardinality at most k+1, and garp
is equivalent to requiring no negative cycles at all. Thus, we can formalize
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the preference axioms in terms of the lengths of negative cycles in a directed
graph. We remark that a cyclic view of revealed preference is briefly outlined
by Vohra [25]. For us, this cyclic formulation has important consequences in
testing for the extent of bidding deviations from the axioms. We will quan-
tify this exactly in Section 3. Before doing so, though, we remark that the
focus on cycles also has important computational consequences.
First, recall that the bidding graph G contains an exponential number
of vertices, one for every subset of the items. Of course, it is not practical to
work with such a graph. Observe, however, that a bundle y /∈ {x1,x2 . . . ,xT }
has zero out-degree in G. Consequently, y cannot be contained in any cy-
cle. Thus, it will suffice to consider only the subgraph induced by the bids
{x1,x2 . . . ,xT }. In a combinatorial auction there is typically one bid per
time period and the number of periods is quite small.4 Hence, the induced
subgraph of the bidding graph that we actually need is of a very manageable
size.
Second, one way to implement a bidding rule is via a mathematical pro-
gram; see, for example, Harsha et al. [13]. The cyclic interpretation of a
bidding rule has two major advantages: we can test the rule very quickly by
searching for negative cycles in a graph. For example, we can test for negative
cycles of length at most k+1 either by fast matrix multiplication or directly
by looking for shortest paths of length k using the Bellman-Ford algorithm
in O(T 3) time. Another major advantage is that a bidder can interpret the
consequence of a prospective new bid dynamically by consideration of the
bidding graph. This is extremely important in practice. In contrast, bidding
rules that require using an optimization solver as a black-box are very opaque
to bidders.
3 Approximate Virtual Valuation Functions
For combinatorial auctions, Afriat’s result that garp is necessary and suffi-
cient for rationalisability can be reformulated as:
Theorem 3.1. A valuation function which rationalises bidding behaviour
exists if and only if the bidding graph has no negative cycle.
This is a simple corollary of Theorem 3.2 below; see also [25]. From an eco-
nomic perspective, however, what is most important is not whether agents
are perfectly rational but “whether optimization is a reasonable way to de-
4 For example, in a bandwidth auction there are at most a few hundred rounds.
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scribe some behavior” [22].5 It is then important to study the consequences
of approximately rational behaviour, see, for example, Akerlof and Yellen [2].
First, though, is it possible to quantify the degree to which agents are ratio-
nal? Gross [11] examines assorted methods to test the degree of rationality.
Notable amongst them is the Afriat Efficiency Index [1,22]. Here the condi-
tion required to imply a preference is strengthened multiplicatively. Specifi-
cally, xt  y only if pt ·y ≤ λ·pt ·xt where λ < 1. We examine this index with
respect to the bidding graph in Section 4.4. For combinatorial auctions, a
variant of this constraint was examined experimentally by Harsha et al. [13].
Here we show how to quantify exactly the degree of rationality present
in the data via a parameter of the bidding graph. Moreover, we are able to
go beyond multiplicative guarantees and obtain stronger additive bounds.
To wit, we say that vˆ is an ǫ-approximate virtual valuation function if, for
all t and for any bundle y,
vˆ(xt)− pt · xt ≥ vˆ(y)− pt · y − ǫ .
Note that if ǫ = 0, then the bidder is optimizing with respect to a virtual
valuation function, i.e. is rational. We remark that the term virtual reflects
the fact that vˆ need not be the real valuation function (if one exists) of the
bidder, but if it is then the bidding is termed truthful.
3.1 Minimum Mean Cycles and Approximate Virtual Valuations
We now examine exactly when a bidding strategy is approximately rational.
It turns out that the key to understanding approximate deviations from
rationality is the minimum mean cycle in the bidding graph. Given a cycle
C in G, its mean length is
µ(C) =
∑
a∈C ℓa
|C|
.
We denote by µ(G) = minC µ(C) the minimum mean length of a cycle in G,
and we say that C∗ is a minimum mean cycle if C∗ ∈ argminC µ(C). We can
find a minimum mean cycle in polynomial time using the classical techniques
of Karp [15].
Theorem 3.2. An ǫ-approximate valuation function which (approximately)
rationalises bidding behaviour exists if and only if the bidding graph has
minimum mean cycle µ(G) ≥ −ǫ.
5 Indeed, several schools of thought in the field of bounded rationality argue that people
utilize simple (but often effective) heuristics rather than attempt to optimize; see, for
example, [10].
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Proof. From the bidding graph G we create an auxiliary directed graph
Gˆ = (Vˆ , Aˆ) with vertex set Vˆ = {x1,x2, . . . ,xT }. The arc set is complete
with arc lengths
ℓˆxs,xt = ℓxs,xt − µ(G) .
Observe that, by construction, every cycle in Gˆ is of non-negative length.
It follows that we may obtain shortest path distances dˆ from any arbitrary
root vertex r. Thus, for any arc (xt,y), we have
dˆ(y) ≤ dˆ(xt) + ℓˆxt,y
= dˆ(xt) + ℓxt,y − µ(G)
≤ dˆ(xt) + pt · (y − xt)− µ(G) .
So, if we set vˆ(x) = dˆ(x), for each x, then
vˆ(xt)− pt · xt ≥ vˆ(y)− pt · y + µ(G) .
for all t. Therefore, by definition of ǫ-approximate bidding, we have that vˆ
is a (−µ)-approximate virtual valuation function.
Conversely, let vˆ be an ǫ-approximate virtual valuation function which
rationalises the graph, and take some cycle C of minimum mean length
in the bidding graph. Suppose for a contradiction that µ(C) < −ǫ. By
ǫ-approximability, we have
vˆ(xs)− ps · xs ≥ vˆ(xt)− ps · xt − ǫ .
But ℓxs,xt ≥ ps · (xt − xs). Therefore ℓxsxt ≥ vˆ(xt) − vˆ(xs) − ǫ. Summing
over every arc in the cycle we obtain
ℓ(C) =
∑
(x,y)∈C
ℓxy ≥
∑
(x,y)∈C
(vˆ(y)− vˆ(x)− ǫ) = −|C| · ǫ .
Thus µ(C) ≥ −ǫ, giving the desired contradiction. ⊓⊔
Recall that, the bidding behaviour is irrational only if µ(G) is strictly
negative. We emphasize that Theorem 3.2 applies even when µ(G) is positive,
but in this case, we have an ǫ-approximate virtual valuation function where
ǫ is negative! What does this mean? Well, setting δ = −ǫ, we then have, for
all t and for any bundle y, that vˆ(xt) − pt · xt ≥ vˆ(y) − pt · y + δ. Thus,
xt is not just the best choice, but it provides at least an extra δ units of
utility over any other bundle. Thus, the larger δ is, the greater our degree of
confidence in the revealed preference-ordering and valuation.
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3.2 Individually Rational Virtual Valuation Functions
Theorem 3.2 shows how to obtain a virtual valuation function with the best
possible additive approximation guarantee: any valuation rationalising the
bidding graph G must allow for an additive approximation of at least −µ(G).
However, there is a problem. Such a valuation function may not actually be
compatible with the data; specifically, it may not be individually rational. For
individual rationality, we require, for each time t, that vˆ(xt) − pt · xt ≥ 0.
But individually rationality is (almost certainly) violated for the the root
node r since we have vˆ(xr) = 0.
It is possible to obtain an individually rational, approximate, virtual
valuation function simply by taking the vˆ from Theorem 3.2 and adding a
huge constant to value of each package. This operation, of course, is entirely
unnatural and the resulting valuation function is of little practical value.
The Minimum Individually Rational Virtual Valuation Function.
We say that v() is the minimum individually rational, ǫ-approximate virtual
valuation function if v(xt) ≤ ω(xt) for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , for any other indi-
vidually rational, ǫ-approximate virtual valuation function ω(). This leads
to the questions: (i) Does such a valuation function exist? and (ii) Can it be
obtained efficiently? The answer to both these questions is yes.
Theorem 3.3. The minimum individually rational, µ-approximate virtual
valuation function exists and can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. We create an auxiliary directed graph H from Gˆ by adding a sink
vertex z. We add an arc (xt,z) of length −pt · xt, for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
allowing for repeated arcs. Because Gˆ contains no negative cycle, neither
does H. Therefore, there exist shortest path distances in H. Denote by dˆ()
the shortest path distance from vertex xt to z in H. We claim that setting
v(xt) = −dˆ(xt) gives the minimum individually rational, µ-approximate
virtual valuation function.
To begin, let’s verify that v() is an individually rational, µ-approximate
virtual valuation function. First, we require that v() is individually rational.
Now the direct path consisting of the arc (xt,z) is at least as long as the
shortest path from xt to z. Thus, −pt · xt ≥ dˆ(xt). Individual rationality
then follows as v(xt) = −dˆ(xt) ≥ pt · xt.
Second we need to show that v() is µ-approximate. Consider a pair
{xs,xt}. The shortest path conditions imply that
−v(xs) = dˆ(xs) ≤ ℓˆst + dˆ(xt) = (ℓst − µ) + dˆ(xt) = (ℓst − µ)− v(xt) .
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Here the inequality follows from the shortest path conditions on dˆ(). There-
fore, by definition of ℓst,
v(xt) ≤ v(xs) + ℓst − µ
= v(xs) + min
s′
{ps′ · (xt − xs) : xs′ = xs} − µ
≤ v(xs) + ps · (xt − xs)− µ .
Hence, v() is µ-approximate as desired.
Finally we require that v() is minimum individually rational. So, take any
other individually rational, µ-approximate virtual valuation ω(). We must
show that v(xt) ≤ ω(xt) for every bundle xt. Now consider the shortest path
tree T in H corresponding to dˆ(). If (xt,z) is an arc in T (and at least one
such arc exists) then −pt · xt = dˆ(xt). Thus
v(xt)− pt · xt = (−pt · xt)− dˆ(xt) = 0 ≤ ω(xt)− pt · xt .
Here the inequality follows by the individual rationality of ω(). Thus v(xt) ≤ ω(xt).
Now suppose that v(xs) > ω(xs) for some xs. We may take xs to be the
closest vertex to the root z in T with this property. We have seen that xs
cannot be a child of z. So let (xs,xt) be an arc in T . As xt is closer to the
root than xs, we know v(xt) ≤ ω(xt). Then, as T is a shortest path tree, we
have dˆ(xs) = ℓˆst + dˆ(xt). Consequently −v(xs) = ℓˆst − v(xt), and so
ω(xt) ≥ v(xt) = ℓˆst + v(xs) > ℓˆst + ω(xs) .
But then
ω(xt) > ω(xs) + ℓst − µ = ω(xs) + min
s′
{ps′ · (xt − xs) : xs′ = xs} − µ .
It follows that there is at least one time period when xs was selected
in violation of the µ-optimality of ω(). So v() is a minimum individually
rational, µ-approximate virtual valuation function. ⊓⊔
TheMaximum (Individually Rational) Virtual Valuation Function.
The minimum individually rational virtual valuation function allows us to
obtain worst-case social welfare guarantees when revealed preference is used
in mechanism design, see Section 4. For the best-case welfare guarantees, we
are interested in finding the maximum virtual valuation function. In general,
this need not exist as we may add an arbitrary constant to each bundle’s
valuation given by the minimum individually rational virtual valuation func-
tion. But, it does exist provided we have an upper bound on the valuation
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of at least one bundle. This is often the case. For example in a combinatorial
auction if a bidder drops out of the auction at time t + 1, then pt+1 · xt is
an upper bound on the value of bundle xt. Furthermore, in practice, bidders
(and the auctioneer) often have (over)-estimates of the maximum possible
value of some bundles.
So suppose we are given a set I and constraints of the form v(xi) ≤ βi for
each i ∈ I. Then there is a uniquemaximum µ-approximate virtual valuation
function.
Theorem 3.4. Given a set of constraints, the maximum µ-approximate vir-
tual valuation function exists and can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Let v(xi) ≤ βi for each i ∈ I. We construct a graph H from Gˆ by
adding a source vertex z with arcs of length βi from z to xi, for each i ∈ I.
Since z has in-degree zero, H has no negative cycles because Gˆ does not.
Denote by dˆ() the shortest distance of every vertex from z. We claim that
setting v(x) = dˆ(x) gives us the desired maximum µ-approximate valuation
function.
To prove this, we first begin by checking that it satisfies the upper-bound
constraints. This is trivial, because for each i ∈ I there is a path consisting
of one arc of length βi from z to xi. Thus the shortest path to xi has length
at most βi. Second, the valuation function v() = dˆ() is µ-approximate by
the choice of arc length in Gˆ. Third, we show that this valuation function
is maximum. So, take any other µ-approximate virtual valuation ω() that
satisfies the upper bound constraints I. We must show that v(xt) ≥ ω(xt) for
every bundle xt. For a contradiction, suppose that P = {z,y1,y2, . . . ,yr} is
the shortest path from z to yr in H and that v(yr) < ω(yr). Observe that
the node adjacent to z on P must be y1 = xi for some i ∈ I. Now because
ω() is a µ-approximate valuation function, we have
r−1∑
j=1
ω(yj+1) ≤
r−1∑
j=1
(
ω(yj) + ℓyj ,yj+1 − µ
)
=
r−1∑
j=1
(
ω(yj) + ℓˆyj ,yj+1
)
.
Cancelling terms produces
ω(yr) ≤ ω(y1) +
r−1∑
j=1
ℓˆyj ,yj+1 ≤ βj +
r−1∑
j=1
ℓˆyj ,yj+1 = dˆ(yr) = v(yr) .
Here the second inequality follows by the facts that y1 = xi, for some i ∈ I,
and ω() satisfies the upper bound constraint ω(xi) ≤ βi. This contradicts
the assumption that v(yr) < ω(yr). ⊓⊔
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Notice that Theorem 3.4 does not guarantee that the maximum virtual
valuation function is individually rational. For example, suppose βt = pt ·xt,
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Individual rationality then implies that v(xt) must equal
pt ·xt for every bundle. In general, however, such a valuation function is not
µ-approximate. In such cases no individually rational µ-approximate virtual
valuation functions may exist that satisfy the upper bound constraints. On
the other hand, suppose such a virtual valuation function does exist. Then
the maximum µ-approximate virtual valuation function in Theorem 3.4 must
be individually rational by maximality.
4 Revealed Preference Auction Bidding Rules
So far, we have focused upon how to test the degree of rationality reflected
in a data set. Specifically, we saw in Theorem 3.2 that the minimum mean
length of a cycle, µ(G), gives an exact and optimal goodness of fit measure
for rationality. Furthermore, Theorem 3.3 explained how to quickly obtain
the minimum individually rational valuation function that best fits the data.
Recall, however, that revealed preference is also used as tool in mecha-
nism design. In particular, we saw in Section 2.2 how revealed preference is
used to impose bidding constraints in combinatorial auctions. We will now
show how to apply the combinatorial arguments we have developed to create
other relaxed revealed preference constraints.
4.1 Relaxed Revealed Preference Bidding Rules
Consider a combinatorial auction at time (round) t where our prior price-
bundle bidding pairs are {(p1,x1), (p2,x2), . . . , (pt−1,xt−1)}. By Inequality
(6) in section 2.2, rational bidding at time t implies that
v(xt)− pt · xt ≥ v(xs)− pt · xs, for all s < t.
Moreover, a necessary condition is then that (pt − ps) · xs ≥ (pt − ps) · xt
and this can easily be checked by searching for negative length digons in the
bidding graph induced by the first t bids. If such a cycle is found then the
bid (pt,xt) is not permitted by the auction mechanism.
The non-permittal of bids is clearly an extreme measure, and one that
can lead to the exclusion of bidders from the auction even when they still
have bids they wish to make. In this respect, it may be desirable for the
mechanism to use a relaxed set of revealed preference bidding rules. The
natural approach is to insist not upon strictly rational bidders but rather just
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upon approximately rational bidders. Specifically, the auction mechanism
may (dynamically) select a desired degree ǫ of rationality. This requires that
at time t,
v(xt)− pt · xt ≥ v(xs)− pt · xs − ǫ, for all s < t.
A necessary condition then is (pt−ps) ·xs ≥ (pt−ps) ·xt− 2ǫ, and we can
test this relaxed warp-based bidding rule by insisting that every digon has
mean length at least −ǫ. Similarly, the relaxed karp-based bidding rule is
(pk − p0) · x0 ≥
k∑
i=1
(pi − pi−1) · xi − (k + 1) · ǫ (10)
The relaxed garp-based bidding rule applies the relaxed karp-based
bidding rule for every choice of k. The imposition of the relaxed garp-based
bidding rule ensures approximate rationality.
Theorem 4.1. A set of price-bid pairings {(pt,xt) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T} has a
corresponding ǫ-approximate individually rational virtual valuation function
if and only if it satisfies the relaxed garp-based bidding rule.
Proof. Suppose the relaxed garp-based bidding rule is satisfied. By The-
orem 3.2, it suffices to show that the minimum mean cycle in the bidding
graph with arc lengths ℓ is at least −ǫ. So take any collection {xi}
k
i=1 of
bundles. Let ti be the time when ℓxi,xi+1 was minimized, and let pi := pti .
Then we have
−(k + 1) · ǫ ≤ (pk − p0) · x0 −
∑k
i=1
(pi − pi−1) · xi
=
∑k
i=0
pi · (xi+1 − xi)
=
∑k
i=0
ℓxi,xi+1
Here, the inequality follows because the relaxed garp-based bidding rule is
satisfied. (Again the subscripts are taken modulo k + 1.) Since, the corre-
sponding cycle contains k + 1 arcs, we see that the length of the minimum
mean cycle is at least −ǫ.
Conversely, if the bidding data has a corresponding ǫ-approximate indi-
vidually rational virtual valuation function then the relaxed bidding rules
are satisfied. ⊓⊔
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4.2 Relaxed KARP-Based Bidding Rules
Theorem 4.1 tells us that imposing the relaxed garp-based bidding rule
ensures approximate rationality. But, in practice, even warp-based bidding
rules are often confusing to real bidders. There is likely therefore to be some
resistance to the idea of imposing the whole gamut of garp-based bidding
rules. We believe that this combinatorial view of revealed preference, where
the bidding rules can be tested via cycle examination, will eradicate some of
the confusion. However, for simplicity, there is some worth in quantitatively
examining the consequences of imposing a weaker relaxed karp-based bid-
ding rule rather than the garp-based bidding rule. To test for the relaxed
karp-based bidding rules, we simply have to examine cycles of length at
most k + 1. Now suppose the karp-based bidding rules are satisfied. By
finding the µ(G) in the bidding graph we can still obtain the best-fit ad-
ditive approximation guarantee, but we no longer have that this guarantee
is ǫ. We can still, though, prove a strong additive approximation guarantee
even for small values of k. To do this we need the following result.
Theorem 4.2. Given a complete directed graph G with arc lengths ℓ. If ev-
ery cycle of cardinality at most k+1 has non-negative length then the mini-
mum mean length of a cycle is at least − ℓ
max
k
, where ℓmax = maxe∈E(G) |ℓe|.
Proof. Take any cycle C with cardinality |C| > k + 1. Let the arcs of C be
{e1, e2, . . . , e|C|} in order. Then
|C|∑
i=1
i+k−1∑
j=i
ℓej = k ·
|C|∑
i=1
ℓei = k · ℓ(C) = k · |C| ·
ℓ(C)
|C|
. (11)
Above, the inner summation is taken modulo |C|. On the other hand take
any path segment P = {ei, ei+1, . . . , ei+k−1}, where again the subscript sum-
mation is modulo |C|. Because the graph is complete and the maximum arc
length is ℓmax, the length of P is at least −ℓmax. Otherwise, we have a neg-
ative length cycle of cardinality k+ 1 by adding to P the arc from the head
vertex of ei+k−1 to the tail vertex of ei. Thus,
|C|∑
i=1
i+k−1∑
j=i
ℓej ≥ −|C| · ℓ
max . (12)
Combining Equalities (11) and Inequality (12) gives that ℓ(C)|C| ≥ −
ℓmax
k
. As
every cycle of cardinality at most k + 1 has non-negative mean length, this
implies that the minimum mean length of any cycle in G is at least − ℓ
max
k
.
⊓⊔
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This result is important as it allows us to bound the degree of rationality
that must arise whenever we impose the relaxed karp-based bidding rule.
Corollary 4.1. Given a set of price-bid pairings {(pt,xt) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T} that
satisfy the relaxed karp-based bidding rule, there is a ( b
max
k
+ ǫ)-approximate
individually rational virtual valuation function, where bmax is the maximum
bid made by the bidder during the auction.
Proof. The relaxed karp-based bidding rule (10) implies that every cycle of
cardinality at most k + 1 in the bidding graph G has mean length at least
−ǫ. Let G′ be the modified graph with arc lengths ℓ′
xs,xt
:= ℓxs,xt + ǫ. Then
every cycle in G′ of cardinality at most k + 1 has non-negative length. By
Theorem 4.2, the minimum mean length of a cycle in G′ is then at most
(ℓ′)max
k
. Furthermore, (ℓ′)max = ℓmax + ǫ ≤ bmax + ǫ. Theorems 3.2 and 3.3
then guarantee the existence of a ( b
max
k
+ǫ)-approximate individually rational
virtual valuation function. ⊓⊔
One may ask whether the additive approximation guarantee in Corol-
lary 4.1 can be improved. The answer is no; Theorem 4.2 is tight.
Lemma 4.1. There is a graph G where each cycle of cardinality at most
k + 1 has non-negative length and the minimum mean length of a cycle is
−ℓmax/k.
Proof. LetG be a complete directed graph with vertex set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}.
We will define arc lengths ℓ such that all (k+1)-cycles in G have non-negative
length, but the minimum mean length of a cycle is − ℓ
max
k
. First consider the
cycle C0 = {v1, v2, . . . , vk+2, v1}. Give each arc in C0 a length −
ℓmax
k
. Thus
C0 has cardinality k + 2 and mean length −
ℓmax
k
. Now let every other arc e
have length ℓmax. It immediately follows that the only cycle in G with nega-
tive length is C0. Thus, all cycles of length at most k+ 1 have non-negative
length, but the minimum mean length of a cycle is − ℓ
max
k
, as desired.
4.3 Welfare Guarantees with Revealed Preference Rules
Our results from Section 3 give approximate rationality guarantees on indi-
vidual bidders. We briefly outline this here. By applying the above relaxed
revealed preference bidding rules to each bidder, we can now obtain guaran-
tees on the overall social welfare of the entire auction. For example, consider
imposing the relaxed garp bidding rules. Now suppose each bidder uses
a minimum, individually rational, ǫ-approximate virtual valuation function
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that satisfies the gross substitutes property. It is known that if bidder valu-
ation functions satisfy the gross substitutes property then the simultaneous
multi-round auction (SMRA) will converge to a Walrasian equilibrium and
maximize social welfare [17,12,16]. Consequently, the output allocation now
maximizes virtual welfare to within an additive factor per bidder. One may
expect there is some maximum discrepancy (say, in the L∞ norm) between
the true valuation function and some virtual approximate virtual valuation.
If so, because the implemented virtual valuations are minimum, we can then
lower-bound the true social welfare. Similarly, best-case bounds follow using
the maximum approximate virtual valuation function.
4.4 Alternate Bidding Rules
Interestingly other bidding rules used in practice or proposed in the literature
can be viewed in the graphical framework. For example, bid withdrawals
correspond to vertex deletion in the bidding graph, whilst budget constraints
and the Afriat Efficiency Index can be formulated in terms of arc-deletion.
We briefly describe these applications here.
Revealed Preference with Budgets. Recall that, in Section 2.2, we have
assumed that, in the quasilinear model, bidders have no budgetary con-
straints. This is not a natural assumption. Harsha et al. [13] explain how to
implement budgeted revealed preference in a combinatorial auction. Their
method applies to the case when the fixed budget B is unknown to the auc-
tion mechanism. To do this, upper and lower bounds on feasible budgets are
maintained dynamically via a linear program. It is also straightforward to
do this combinatorially using edge-deletion in the bidding graph; we omit
the details as the process resembles that of the following subsection.
The Afriat Efficiency Index. Recall that to determine the Afriat Effi-
ciency Index we reveal xt  y only if pt · y ≤ λ · pt · xt where λ < 1. This
is equivalent, in Afriat’s original setting, to removing from the graph any
arc (xt,xs) for which pt · xs > λ · pt · xt. Of course, for the application
of combinatorial auctions, we assume quasi-linear utilities. Therefore, the
appropriate implementation is to remove any arc (xt,xs) for which
v(xs)− ptxs > λ · (v(xt)− ptxt) .
How, though, can we implement this rule as v() is unknown? We can simply
apply the techniques of Section 3 and use for v the minimum individually
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rational virtual valuation function. We can now determine the best choice
of λ that gives a predetermined, ǫ additive approximation guarantee ǫ. This
can easily be computed exactly by bisection search over the set of arcs, as
each arc a has its own critical value λa at which it will be removed. The
optimal choice arises at the point where the minimum mean cycle in the
bidding graph rises above −ǫ. When ǫ = 0, the corresponding choice of λ is
the anolog of the Afriat Efficiency Index.
Revealed Preference with Bid Withdrawals. Some iterative multi-item
auctions allow for bid withdrawals, most notably the simultaneous multi-
round auction (SMRA). Bid withdrawals may easily be implemented along
with revealed preference bidding rules. At time t, a bid withdrawal corre-
sponds to the removal of (a copy of) a vertex xs, where s < t. This may be
important strategically. To see this, suppose the bid xt is invalid under the
karp-based bidding rules because it would induce a negative cycle of cardi-
nality at most k + 1 in the bidding graph on {x1,x2, . . . ,xt}. If xs lies on
all such negative cycles then xt becomes a valid bid after the withdrawal of
xs. Because auctions typically restrict the total number of bid withdrawals
allowed, the optimal application of bid withdrawals correspond to the prob-
lem of finding small hitting sets for the negative length cycles of cardinality
at most k + 1.
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